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DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
James Larkin, John Brunst, Michael Lacey, and Scott Spear (collectively
“Movants”) hereby respond to this Court’s Order to Show Cause why appeal of the
district court’s October 23, 2018 stay order (the “Stay Order”) should not be
dismissed as a nonfinal or nonappealable order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291,
1292(a)(1). Order, Doc. No. 2. This case arises from Movants’ challenge in the
district court to a series of unlawful seizures of publishing assets and proceeds in
violation of the First Amendment, and the Stay Order on appeal was the product of
the government’s effort to avoid ever having to respond to the substance of Movant’s
constitutional claims.
It has been established law for decades that the First Amendment bars the
government from seizing or encumbering the assets or financial proceeds of
publishing activities prior to conviction or, at the very least, an adversary hearing in
which the government has the burden of proof. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,
489 U.S. 46, 63 (1989); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991); Adult Video Ass’n. v. Reno, 41 F.3d
503 (9th Cir. 1994). See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 336-337 (2010)
(laws suppressing speech “may operate at different points in the speech process,”
including by “imposing a burden by impounding proceeds on receipts or royalties”);
Center for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 649-650, 657 (E.D.
1
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Pa. 2004) (even for materials that may be “completely banned,” Fort Wayne Books
requires that a court “make a final determination that the material is [unprotected by
the First Amendment] after an adversary hearing”). A showing of probable cause is
never sufficient to justify such a seizure. Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 66. Ignoring
these principles, the federal government seized millions of dollars of Movants’ assets
based on nothing more than ex parte allegations of probable cause that the operation
of the classified advertising website Backpage.com was associated with criminal
activity. Movants’ challenge to the seizures, and to the process the government used
to accomplish them, was effectively terminated by the district court Stay Order under
review.
This Court has repeatedly held that orders seizing or restraining assets are
appealable as injunctions under Section 1292(a)(1), which confers appellate
jurisdiction over orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving
injunctions.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). In this case, the district court’s stay order has
the effect of continuing the injunction. Even if that were not the case, this Court has
recognized the ability to seek immediate appeal under 28 U.SC. § 1291, where the
grant of a stay leaves a party “effectively out of court.” Davis v. Walker, 745 F.3d
1303, 1308–10 (9th Cir. 2014). More importantly for purposes of the specific issues
presented here, the Supreme Court has held that “[a]djudicating the proper scope of
First Amendment protections has often been recognized … as a ‘federal policy’ that
2
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merits an application of an exception to the general finality rule.” Fort Wayne
Books, 489 U.S. at 55.
This case involves the preemptive seizure of assets and publishing proceeds
that are presumptively protected by the First Amendment, and any stay of the civil
proceedings below, with deferral of consideration of constitutional claims to the end
of associated criminal proceedings, effectively decides the issues and leaves
Movants without a remedy. Under these circumstances, this Court has jurisdiction
to entertain this appeal either as an interlocutory appeal from an injunction order
under Section 1292(a)(1), or as an appealable final order or an appealable collateral
order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Background
On March 28, 2018, the government sought and obtained civil seizure
warrants from the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for most
of the accounts and domain names identified in a criminal indictment brought the
same day against Movants in the District of Arizona. 1 In addition to the criminal
charges, the indictment seeks to forfeit bank accounts, real property and domain
names. On April 6, 2018, the day the government revealed the criminal indictment

United States v. Lacey, et al., D. Ariz. No. CR-18-00422-PHX-SPL
(forfeiture allegations at ¶¶ 157-171) (ECF No. 3). On July 25, 2018, the
government filed a superseding indictment in the District of Arizona, adding new
forfeiture allegations.
1

3
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to the Movants, it (i) executed the civil seizure warrants, arrested Movants, searched
the homes and properties of Movants Lacey and Larkin and seized anything of value
law enforcement could find, and (ii) executed United States Postal Service (“USPS”)
administrative seizure warrants on many of the properties subject to the civil seizure
warrants and additional assets as well. On April 26, 2018, the government instituted
a third wave of civil seizure warrants. The government’s efforts to seize assets have
been ongoing, including, most recently, efforts to seize attorney trust accounts
established for the Movants’ defense. [See Emergency Motion to Stay Seizure of
Attorneys’ Fees and Request for Immediate Hearing, ECF Nos. 360, 365, 376, D.
Ariz. 18-CR-00422].
The government’s legal theory supporting the civil seizures (and the theory
set forth in the indictment) is that the publication of third-party classified
advertisements on the website Backpage.com knowingly facilitated prostitution, and
that Movants’ ownership of and/or involvement with the website violated the Travel
Act and federal money laundering statutes. The government obtained seizure
warrants based on affidavits from a postal inspector asserting probable cause to
believe that most of the advertisements posted on Backpage.com related to illegal
prostitution. The warrants were issued ex parte. No adversary hearing has yet been
conducted to test the validity of the government’s allegations. Altogether, the

4
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government has seized tens of millions of dollars in assets alleged to be tied to illegal
activity on Backpage.com. 2
Movants filed a Motion to Vacate or Modify Seizure Warrants on August 1,
2018. [Motion to Vacate, ECF No. 6, C.D. Cal. 18-CV-06742 (the “Motion”)].
They argued: (1) that the seizures are void because they are predicated on the
erroneous premise that the government may seize the assets or proceeds of a
publishing enterprise before trial based on a showing of probable cause regarding
illegal activity; (2) if the seizures are not immediately vacated, Movants are entitled
to a prompt hearing on the validity of the seizures in which the government has the
burden of proof beyond mere probable cause; (3) the seizures also violate the Fourth
Amendment because the seizure warrants were obtained through knowing or
recklessly false statements and material omissions; and, (4) even without regard to
the First and Fourth Amendments, the Seizures are markedly over-inclusive in
violation of Movants’ Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Accordingly, Movants
sought an order immediately vacating the seizures and ordering the prompt return of
their property. [Id.].

Movants argue that millions of dollars seized are proceeds from print
publications Larkin and Lacey owned before Backpage.com that should be excluded
from the seizure warrants based on the government’s theories of liability. However,
those assets were part of the seizures because there has been no adversary proceeding
to challenge the government’s assertions.
2

5
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The government has never filed a substantive response to Movant’s arguments
for vacating the seizures. After twice seeking and receiving extensions of time from
the Central District of California for responding to the Motion, [ECF Nos. 32 and
40, C.D. Cal. 18-CV-06742], the government filed in the District of Arizona an
“Application for Order Regarding Criminal Forfeiture of Property in Government
Custody,” seeking an order from a different jurisdiction governing possession of the
property seized. [ECF No. 282, D. Ariz. 18-CR-00422]. It sought this order without
informing the District of Arizona of the Motion pending in the Central District of
California, without disclosing the existence of the pending hearing on that Motion,
and without mentioning any of the arguments or case law raised therein. [Id.]. 3 After
again seeking leave to extend the deadline for responding, the government
eventually filed an “Opposition” to the Motion, arguing that any motion for return
of property should be filed in the District of Arizona under Rule 41(g) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. [ECF No. 53, C.D. Cal. 18-CV-06742]. This nominal
opposition did not respond to Movants’ constitutional arguments for vacating the
seizures.

After being informed of the pending proceedings in the Central District of
California, Judge Logan declined to rule on the relief sought by the government until
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California rules on the Defendants’
challenge to the civil seizure warrants. Order, No. CR-18-00422-PHX-SPL, ECF.
No. 340 (D. Ariz. Oct. 16, 2018).
3

6
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On October 5, 2018, the government began filing numerous complaints
seeking civil forfeiture of the assets that had been seized pursuant to the original
seizure warrants, as well as other property. 4 These filings were followed on October
12, by the government’s Ex Parte Application to Stay Civil Proceedings. [ECF No.
79, C.D. Cal. 18-CV-06742]. Judge Klausner granted the stay application on an ex
parte basis on October 23, citing 18 U.S.C. § 981(g) and observing “the government
may seek a stay of civil forfeiture proceedings while it conducts a criminal
investigation or prosecution.” The Stay Order stated that a ruling on the Motion
“could ultimately have preclusive effect on the criminal matter” and that the court
saw no reason “why Movants’ pending motions could not be brought in the criminal
action” in Arizona. [ECF No. 85, C.D. Cal. 18-CV-06742]. This appeal followed.
The government’s aggressive seizures have continued and included civil
seizure warrants directed to various defense counsel, including Davis Wright
Tremaine LLP, co-counsel on this appeal. When defense tried to challenge the
seizures in Arizona, the government responded:
Our position is that any attack on the warrants, the affidavits themselves,
should be brought before the CDCA court. Those attacks are properly brought
before that. Whether it is Franks hearing or whatever motions they feel
appropriate to attack those affidavits are appropriate there.

4

See ECF Docket for C.D. Cal. 18-CR-06742 (listing 27 Related Cases).
7
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[Transcript of Record at 7:10-7:14, Nov. 16, 2018 Hearing, D. Ariz. 18-CR-00422].
The district court in Arizona “decline[d] to exercise jurisdiction over the [C.D. Cal.]
seizure warrants.” [Id. at 55:2-55:3]. It explained:
[T]he Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that considerations of comity
and orderly administration of justice demand that the non-rendering court
[D.AZ] should decline jurisdiction of an action and remand the parties for
their relief to the rendering court [i.e., the C.D. Cal.].
[Id. at 55:14-55:18]. Because the Central District of California stayed Movant’s
challenge to the validity of the seizure warrants (suggesting the issue could be raised
in Arizona), and the District of Arizona now has declined to consider the validity of
the seizures, the courthouse doors have been closed to Movants.
On October 31, this Court issued an Order raising questions about the
jurisdictional basis for the appeal and requiring appellants to move for voluntary
dismissal of the appeal or show cause why it should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. [Order, ECF No. 90, C.D. Cal. 18-CR-06742]. Appellants’ response
setting forth the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction is set forth below.
Argument
I.

The Seizures and Stay Are Appealable Injunctions Under Section
1292(a)(1)
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1),

which confers appellate jurisdiction over orders “granting, continuing, modifying,
refusing or dissolving injunctions.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). In deciding if an order
8
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is an appealable injunction under Section 1292(a)(1), courts look to the “practical
effect” of the order, not whether the district court labeled it an “injunction.” Abbott
v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2318 (2018). In this case, the district court’s Order staying
this action has the effect of continuing the injunction restraining Movants’ assets in
place, and is thus an appealable order under the plain language of Section 1292(a)(1).
Numerous Ninth Circuit cases hold that the denial of injunctive relief followed
by a stay is appealable under Section 1292(a)(1). See e.g., Philip Morris USA, Inc.
v. King Mountain Tobacco Co., Inc., 569 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2017) (jurisdiction under
§ 1292(a)(1) for refusal to grant injunction and imposition of stay); Privitera v. Cal.
Bd. of Md. Quality Assurance, 926 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Agcaoili v.
Gustafson, 870 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1989) (same). Other circuits are in accord. See,
e.g., Goldberg v. Carey, 601 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1979).
This Court has held repeatedly that orders restraining assets are appealable as
injunctions under Section 1292(a)(1). See United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359,
361 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that “[a] pretrial order restraining assets is a preliminary
injunction … and is therefore appealable as such.”); United States v. Roth, 912 F.2d
1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 1990) (an order under 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) is a preliminary
injunction directly appealable under Section 1292(a)(1)); see also United States v.
Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1982) (jurisdiction over order restraining assets
pending resolution of related criminal charges because “denial of interlocutory
9
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review might cause the defendants’ rights to be irreparably lost or impaired because
the due process challenge to the order would become moot upon final disposition of
the criminal trial.”).5 The stay order below freezes in place the asset seizure orders
and thus is immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291(a)(1).
II. The Stay Order is Immediately Appealable as a Final Order or as an
Appealable Collateral Order Because it Effectively Forecloses Review on the
Merits of Defendants’ Constitutional Claims
A. Staying the Proceedings and Refusing to Rule on Defendants’ First
Amendment Challenge to the Asset Seizures is an Appealable Final
Order
Even if the Stay Order were not immediately appealable as an interlocutory
order under Section 1292(b)(1), the Stay is an appealable final order under Section
1291 because it effectively decides the substance of this case and leaves Movants
“effectively out of court.” Davis, 745 F.3d at 1308-10.
The Supreme Court established this principle in Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp.
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 7 (1983), where a contractor sued in federal
court for an order to compel arbitration in response to a hospital’s state claim seeking
Other circuits agree. See, e.g., United States v. Real Prop. Located at 1407
N. Collins, 901 F.3d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 2018) (appellate court had jurisdiction over
defendants’ appeal from district court’s denial of their challenge to government’s
pretrial seizure of their assets because “the district court’s order has ‘the practical
effect’ of granting or denying an injunction.”); 16 C. Wright et al., Federal Practice
and Procedure § 3922.3 (3d ed. 2018) (“Orders controlling the use of property
involved in forfeiture proceedings have been held [immediately] appealable, no
doubt in part because of the drastic consequence threatened by the modern uses of
forfeiture.”).
5

10
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a declaration that the parties’ contract granted no right to arbitration. The district
court stayed the federal case pending resolution of the arbitration question in state
court, but the Supreme Court concluded that the district court’s stay order was
immediately appealable under Section 1291 because it effectively amounted to a
final order for purposes of jurisdiction. Id. at 9. The Court explained that, as a result
of the stay, there would be “no further litigation in the federal forum,” and the state
court’s judgment on the arbitration issue would be res judicata as to future
claims. Id. at 10. Because the state court proceedings would have mooted the
federal case and left plaintiff “effectively out of court,” the stay order was
immediately appealable. Id.
This Court, following a majority of other circuits, extended the Moses H. Cone
Doctrine to allow the immediate appeal of a stay order that “impose[s] lengthy or
indefinite delays.” Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Unity Outpatient Surgery
Ctr., Inc., 490 F.3d 718, 723 (9th Cir. 2007). In Blue Cross, defendants sought a
stay of the civil action because several of them faced a serious risk of criminal
prosecution, and discovery in the civil case implicated their Fifth Amendment rights.
Id. The district court granted the stay, and this Court found it had jurisdiction to
review it, concluding:
[L]engthy and indefinite stays place a plaintiff effectively out of court. Such
an indefinite delay amounts to a refusal to proceed to a disposition on the
merits. Even if litigation may eventually resume, such stays create a danger
of denying justice by delay.
11
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Id. at 724 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Court observed that an
18-month delay is “sufficient to place the plaintiffs effectively out of court.” Id. at
1309. This is particularly a problem when protection of civil liberties is at stake.
Thus, in Davis, this Court held a stay order was immediately appealable to allow a
state prisoner’s claims regarding involuntary medication and abuse to go forward,
because the lengthy and indefinite delays would render the plaintiff “effectively out
of court.” Davis, 745 F.3d at 1309.
That is precisely Movants’ situation. Their Motion in the Central District of
California has been stayed, and the district court in Arizona has refused to assert
jurisdiction over their claims. [Transcript of Record at 55:1-60:3, Nov. 16, 2018
Hearing, D. Ariz 18-CR-00422]. Therefore, their constitutional challenge to the
pretrial seizures at issue in the Motion will not be heard until after the criminal trial,
at which point the primary claims (that First Amendment proceeds cannot be seized
before trial and Movants have a Fifth Amendment right to a prompt hearing) will be
moot. 6
The seizures began in April 2018, the criminal trial is currently scheduled
for January 2020 and is expected to last months. [Scheduling Order, ECF No. 131,
D. Ariz. 18-CR-00422]. If Movants are convicted, their sentencing and the
resolution of their forfeiture claims will occur months or even years later. See
generally Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2. The trial date will almost certainly be continued.
At hearings in October 2018, Judge Logan suggested that a January 2020 trial date
seemed unrealistic given the volume of discovery. [Transcript of Record at 120:23121:4, Oct. 5, 2018 Hearing, ECF No. 348, D. Ariz. 18-CR-00422]. Since then, the
government has begun seizing defense counsel trust funds necessary to defend these
6

12
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The importance of an immediate appeal in these circumstances has long been
recognized in cases involving restrictions on First Amendment rights. Thus, in
Nat’l. Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977), the
Supreme Court treated a stay order of the Illinois Supreme Court as a final order and
reversed. The Court held that delay in considering an immediate (and expedited)
appeal would be an ongoing burden on rights protected by the First Amendment. Id.
at 43-44. See also United States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 857 (10th Cir. 1992)
(“[F]ederal courts have asserted jurisdiction in a number of contexts involving nonfinal orders, in which the proceedings complained of infringed on First Amendment
rights.”). Cf. Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1979) (immediate appeal
of criminal defendant’s motion to dismiss permitted under the Speech or Debate
Clause).
The Court reached the same conclusion in Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 55,
a case that, like this one, involved the constitutionality of seizing publishers’ assets
prior to conviction. There, the assets and proceeds from the sale of adult books
alleged to be obscene were seized under provisions of state law authorizing pretrial

Movants. Thus, it is likely that at least some of the Movants will need to have
indigent defense counsel appointed, thereby further delaying the trial date. Movants’
Motion is also premised on their Fifth Amendment right to a prompt, pretrial hearing
on the propriety of the seizures. See United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1383
(9th Cir. 1985).
13
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seizures under a judicial order issued on probable cause. Id. at 51. Defendants
sought to vacate the seizures on constitutional grounds, but the trial court denied
relief and certified the issue for interlocutory appeal. After the Indiana Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court ruling, the defendants sought review by the U.S.
Supreme Court, despite 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which limits certiorari jurisdiction over
cases challenging the constitutionality of state statutes to “[f]inal judgments or
decrees” of state courts. Notwithstanding the finality requirement, the Court took
jurisdiction, finding “it would be intolerable to leave unanswered, under these
circumstances, an important question of freedom of the press under the First
Amendment.” Id. at 56. See also Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
246-47 & n.6 (1974) (same). 7
Whether or not these conclusions are valid in a typical case involving seizures,
the government has no greater constitutional authority to seize publishing proceeds
in criminal proceedings than it does in the civil context. See, e.g., Fort Wayne Books,
489 U.S. at 63. Where the First Amendment question to be decided is whether the

The Supreme Court held that the same constitutional limits apply to seizing
the proceeds of publishing activities alleged to be tied to crime in Simon & Schuster,
Inc., 502 U.S. at 115 (such a seizure is “presumptively inconsistent with the First
Amendment” to the extent it “imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the
content of their speech”). See also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 336-337 (laws
suppressing speech include “imposing a burden by impounding proceeds on receipts
or royalties”).
7
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government can seize such proceeds prior to conviction (or at least prior to an
adversary hearing), a stay deferring review to the end of the criminal case effectively
decides the issue and leaves Movants without a remedy. Delay is the decision.8
Contrary to the district court’s assumption, Movants’ have no avenue for relief
via a “Monsanto Motion” under Rule 41(g) in the Arizona criminal case.9 The

This Court’s decision in Andersen v. United States, 298 F.3d 804 (2002) is
not to the contrary. Andersen did not involve asset seizures but dealt with property
seized for purposes of a criminal investigation and possible use as evidence in a
future criminal case. Id. at 806. It is for that reason the majority construed the request
as a Rule 41(e) motion. Id. at 808. In Andersen, the plaintiffs brought a civil case
that attempted to interfere with a criminal case by forcing the government to return
evidence it could potentially use in the criminal case. In this case, by contrast, the
civil case was initiated by the government, and there is no indication that any of the
seized assets are intended to be used as evidence in the criminal case. Rather, this is
a straight asset forfeiture. In construing DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121
(1962), the applicable Supreme Court case, the Andersen majority observed that the
Court gave two reasons for refusing to create an exception to the general finality
rule: It was concerned with impeding the criminal justice process, including the
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, and it concluded that Rule 41(e) motions
are not independent of the associated criminal investigation and thus not severable
from the “larger litigious process.” Andersen, 298 F.3d at 809. However, neither of
these reasons apply to this case because the assets were seized by civil processes,
not criminal warrants, and there is no indication that the government intends to use
any of them in prosecuting the criminal case. Also, Andersen did not present a
situation like the one here, where the pretrial seizure of proceeds with no adversary
hearing is itself an ongoing First Amendment violation.
8

See Stay Order, ECF No. 85 at 2, C.D. Cal. 18-CV-06742. Rule 41(g)
(formerly Rule 41(e)) provides that “[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may move for the property’s
return.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g). Any claim for the return of property based on United
States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989), involves Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights.
9
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District of Arizona has ruled that it will not assert jurisdiction over seizures based
on warrants issued in the Central District of California. [Transcript of Record at
56:1-56:10, Nov. 16, 2018 Hearing, D. Ariz 18-CR-00422]. Even if the Arizona
court would take on the issue (as Central District of California assumed it would),
Monsanto speaks to a much different (and narrower) issue—whether asset seizures
may be excessive and deprive a criminal defendant of effective counsel. The
defendant must make a threshold showing that seized assets are needed to pay for
his counsel of choice, after which the court must conduct a post-seizure, adversary
“Monsanto Hearing.” Here, by contrast, Movants challenge the government’s right
to hold any of their assets as a matter of First Amendment law, and it is the
government’s burden to prove that the assets are subject to forfeiture. Fort Wayne
Books, 489 U.S. at 63 (1989); Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 115.
Unlike the process provided in a Monsanto hearing, for seizures of publishing
assets, the burden of initiating judicial review and of proving that the material is
unprotected expression is on the government, and requires final judicial
determination on the merits.

Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 420-22 (1971).

Accordingly, the district court’s citation of United States v. Unimex, 991 F.2d 546
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(9th Cir. 1993), in the Stay Order, suggesting it provides a “remedy,” is inapposite.10
Even if the suggested remedy addressed the same constitutional issues, Rule 41(g)
is an inadequate vehicle to provide relief in this case. 11 Accordingly, the Stay Order
at issue here is a final order for purposes of appeal.
B. The District Court’s Stay Also is Appealable Under the
Collateral Order Doctrine
Even if the Stay Order is not deemed a “final order” for purposes of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, it still is appealable as a “collateral order” under Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).

The Collateral Order Doctrine

recognizes “that § 1291’s reference to ‘final decisions’ includes certain interlocutory
orders that ‘finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights
asserted in the action[.]” Walker, 745 F.3d at 1308 (citing Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546).
“To fall within the small class of collateral orders that may be immediately appealed

While the prospect of some form of relief under Monsanto does not affect
the appealability of the Stay Order below, Movants reserve their right to seek relief
under Monsanto in an appropriate circumstance.
10

This is true for several reasons. First, Rule 41(g) is not available as a
criminal motion once civil forfeiture complaints are filed, as they were here. United
States v. U.S. Currency $83,310.78, 851 F.2d 1231, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 1988); Omidi
v. United States, 851 F.3d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 2017) (Rule 41(g) motions are not
available after civil forfeiture proceedings are initiated). Second, Rule 41(g) by its
plain terms requires the motions be filed “in the district where the property was
seized,” so it is unclear how the district court in Arizona could exercise jurisdiction
over assets seized pursuant to warrants issued in the Central District of California.
See Unimex, 991 F.2d at 550-51.
11
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under Cohen, the order must (1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2)
resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3)
be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Walker, 745 F.3d at
1308 (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)).
The Cohen factors are satisfied here. First, the Stay Order conclusively
determines disputed questions in the forfeiture proceeding in the district court
including 1) the constitutionality of seizing publishing proceeds before trial and 2)
Movants’ right to a prompt hearing. The stay renders those constitutional violations
a fait accompli. Second, the district court stayed the Central District of California
proceedings because of a potential res judicata effect on the Arizona criminal case.
This is a completely separate issue from the merits of Movants’ Motion. Third, the
Stay Order will be unreviewable if not appealed immediately. Again, the case below
is premised on the unconstitutionality of the pretrial seizure of publishing proceeds
and the violation of Movants’ right to a prompt hearing. An appeal of those issues
after trial, and years in the future, would be pointless. See Lockyer v. Mirant, 398
F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Marchetti v. Bitterolf, 968 F.2d 963, 966 (9th
Cir. 1992) (unreviewability factor met where it was likely that case would be
mooted)).
The Collateral Order Doctrine often has been cited as an additional reason to
allow immediate appeals in cases involving First Amendment rights. In Village of
18
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Skokie, for example, the Supreme Court found that a refusal to stay an injunction
was immediately appealable under Cohen because the denial of First Amendment
rights was “separable from, and collateral to” the merits, and failure to take
jurisdiction would ignore the “strict procedural safeguards” required in free speech
matters, “including immediate appellate review.” 432 U.S. at 44. Similarly, the
Tenth Circuit in P.H.E., Inc. held that the Collateral Order Doctrine applied where
the government used “the burden of repeated criminal prosecutions to chill the
exercise of First Amendment rights.” 965 F.2d at 855. Under those circumstances,
it found the district court’s order implicates “important right[s] which would be ‘lost,
probably irreparably,’ if review had to await final judgment.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Stay Order at issue here is appealable under the same reasoning.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should find that it has jurisdiction to
hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. §§1291 and 1292(a)(1) and should maintain the
expedited briefing schedule issued by Order of November 1, 2018. [Doc. No. 1].
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20 day of November, 2018.
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